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ABSTRACT 
 
To analyze migrants’ remittance motivations we extend the mixed-motives model of 
private transfers developed by Cox et al (2004), incorporating subjectively-assessed 
recipient welfare. We test the model with customized survey data from Fiji, finding 
evidence supportive of altruism for households below a subjective threshold level, 
indicating that international migrants’ remittances provide important social protection 
coverage to households where formal social protection systems are lacking.Unlike 
previous studies, we also find a positive, exchange-motivated relationship for those 
above the threshold. The conventional linear model applied to the same sample 
uncovers neither relationship. We conclude that either crowding-out or crowding-in of 
remittances can occur when recipients’ welfare improves, depending on the 
household’s pre-transfer welfare level. The net effects of recipients’ welfare 
improvements on remittances, and the effects of remittances on poverty alleviation 
and income distribution, are consequently more complex and ambiguous than 
previous studies suggest. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Much of the recent literature on the remittances of migrants focuses on the modelling 
and empirical testing of the donors’ motives, especially, in relation to the 
responsiveness of these transfers to the recipients’ pre-transfer welfare or income.1 
This focus is motivated by the concern that if remittances are driven predominantly by 
altruism, it can be expected that the level of remittances sent to a household will be 
negatively related to its pre-transfer income level. In this case, poverty alleviation and 
income redistributive interventions targeting poorer households could be thwarted by 
compensating reductions in remittances. This possibility was first raised by Becker 
(1974) and Barro (1974) in relation to private transfers within a developed country 
context. In a developing country context in which private transfers are often 
dominated by international migrants’ remittances, a reduction in the flow of such 
transfers caused by rising income levels among the poorer households would have the 
additional consequence of reducing the inflow of foreign exchange. Possible tensions 
could therefore arise between the goals of poverty alleviation on the one hand, and, 
and supplementing foreign exchange earnings through migrants’ remittances on the 
other. 
 
In an important departure from earlier models of private transfer determinants Cox 
and others introduced a mixed-motives model (Cox, 1987; Cox, Eser and Jimenez, 
1998; Cox, Hansen and Jimenez, 2004).2 For them, the donor’s transfers are driven 
potentially by both altruism and exchange motives. At low income levels below some 
threshold, altruism is the dominant motive and the relationship between the recipient’s 
income and the level of transfers is negative. Once the threshold level is reached and 
the exchange motive takes over, the relationship changes. It could become positive or 
remain negative as discussed below, but the main implication is the hypothesized non-
linear relationship between transfers and recipient income. They test their model by 
estimating a spline function, using data from the Philippines. Their spline model 
uncovers a much stronger, negative relationship for pre-transfer recipient income 
below the threshold than that estimated in previous studies that assume a conventional 
linear model. They thus conclude that crowding-out of private transfers is likely to 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive overview of this literature see Rapoport and Docquier (2006). 
2 For an extensive synthesis of the theoretical and applied literature on private, inter-household transfers, see 
Cox and Fafchamps (2008).  
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thwart public welfare programs for the poor. However, they find no evidence of a 
strong relationship between transfers and income for those households above the 
threshold, indicating little support for their hypothesized switch to exchange-
motivated transfers at higher income levels. In this case there could indeed be a trade-
off between the competing objectives of poverty alleviation and fostering remittance 
inflows.  
 
In this paper we extend the mixed-motives model of Cox et al (2004) by incorporating 
explicitly, subjectively-assessed recipient need in place of an absolute income 
threshold at which the donor’s dominant motive switches from altruism to exchange. 
This refinement has the advantage of providing a theoretically justifiable basis for 
setting the knot-point of the estimated spline function that is consistent with recent 
literature on relative deprivation and subjective welfare, and amenable to empirical 
measurement independently of the econometric estimation of the model. 
 
We then test the extended mixed-motives model with household data compiled by the 
authors from the main island of Fiji, Viti Levu, based on a customized questionnaire 
that included questions relating to remittances and income including some designed 
specifically to gauge households’ self-assessed ‘adequate’ level of income.3 We then 
use this survey-based estimate of ‘required income’ to construct a measure of 
household need (or welfare) which we label the ‘Subjective Income Gap’. To our 
knowledge no previous study has applied such a measure of self-assessed welfare to 
testing models of private transfer motivations, and nor has a mixed-motives model 
been previously applied to the analysis of international migrants’ remittances.  
 
Like Cox et al (2004) we find evidence of a strong negative relationship for income 
levels below the threshold level, but, in addition, we find a statistically significant 
positive relationship between transfers and recipients’ welfare for income levels above 
the threshold level. The conventional linear model applied to the same sample 
uncovers neither relationship. This we interpret as evidence of the exchange motive 
dominating transfer behavior once the welfare of the household ceases to be the main 
concern of the donor.  
                                                 
3 See World Bank (2006) for further details of this study. 
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We conclude that either crowding-out or crowding-in of remittances can occur when 
recipient welfare improves, depending on where the household’s pre-transfer welfare 
level is in relation to the subjectively-assessed threshold level. This also has potential 
implications for the distributional impact of remittances, depending on the relative 
strength of these effects (see Stark et al, 1986; Taylor, 1992). The net effects of 
recipients’ welfare improvements on remittances, and the effects of remittances on 
poverty alleviation and income distribution are consequently more complex and 
ambiguous than previous studies suggest. 
 
Section 2 presents the mixed motives model of transfers and its empirical testing 
while section 3 introduces the concept of subjectively-assessed need, showing how 
subjective welfare can be formally incorporated in a Cox-type model. Section 4 
discusses the 2005 household survey data from Fiji and presents descriptive statistics, 
including our measure of household self-assessed need used to define the threshold 
income level and knot-point in the spline function. Section 5 presents and discusses 
the econometric results. In section 6 conclusions are presented. 
 
 
2. The mixed-motives framework 
 
 The formal model 
The mixed-motives model nests Becker’s (1974) altruism model and exchange in a 
single theoretical framework. The donor is thus altruistic and as such incorporates in 
her utility function the household’s, but she also consumes services (S) provided by 
the household. Therefore the donor will choose the level of transfers (T) and services 
(S) that maximizes his/her utility. Formally the maximization program of the donor is 
given by:   
 
( )[ ]SCVSCUMax hd
ST
d ,,,
,
          (1) 
where,   
Ud = donor’s utility 
T = transfers provided by the donor to the recipient household 
 4
S = services provided to recipient household to the donor 
Cd = donor’s consumption 
V = recipient household’s utility from the donor’s point of view 
Ch = recipient household’s income from all sources, excluding transfers 
 
If, at the extreme, a sudden drop in a household’s income pushes them into poverty, 
altruism is likely to dominate the donor’s behavior in the sense that transfers are 
driven by nothing more that concern for the recipient’s welfare. Once the recipient’s 
pre-transfer income recovers, reducing their need for additional income support, the 
donor’s altruistic motives can be expected to diminish if not to disappear altogether. 
However, for Cox et al (2004) this does not necessarily imply that transfers will cease. 
One of the implications of their model is that there is some threshold level of 
recipient’s pre-transfer income at which the altruism motive disappears, and the 
“exchange” motive becomes dominant, taking over as the main driver of the donor’s 
transfer behavior at the margin. Where the exchange motive dominates, the donor is 
driven by self-interest. Transfers are aimed at providing compensation for household 
services rather than at increasing the household’s standard of living. In making a 
transfer the donor expects to receive some good or service in exchange.  
 
Cox et al (2004) show that under exchange transfers could increase or decrease with 
recipient pre-transfer income, depending on the donor’s price elasticity of demand for 
the household’s services. If it is assumed that there is no close market substitute for 
the household’s services, the donor’s demand for these services is likely to be 
relatively price inelastic in which case a positive relationship between the recipient’s 
income and the donor’s transfers can be expected. 
 
When the transfers models are extended to the context of international migration the 
migrant is treated as the donor and remittances as the transfers. Most of the 
remittances empirical literature still assumes the relationship between remittances and 
household welfare variables is monotonic. However, when private transfers are driven 
by alternating altruistic and exchange motivations it would be reasonable to expect a 
non-linear pattern as predicted by Cox’s mixed-motives framework. There have been 
very few empirical tests of the mixed motives model.  
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Tests of the mixed-motives model 
To test their non-linear model Cox et al (2004) estimate a spline function as opposed 
to the conventional linear model, with the knot-point of the spline given by the 
threshold level of income at which the motives switch. They use cross-sectional 
household survey data a large dataset with 18,922 households from the Philippines, a 
low-income country where there is not a formal system of social protection, in which 
transfers are dominated by private, intra-familial transfers. In comparison with 
previous estimates, they find a much stronger negative relationship between transfers 
and pre-transfer income at income levels below the knot-point. But, at income levels 
above the threshold their results indicate no statistically significant relationship, 
suggesting that the exchange motive is non-existent or at best, very weak. 
 
In a similar vein, Kazianga (2006) uses a dataset of 8,474 households in Burkina Faso 
to analyze the effect of the recipient’s income on internal transfers. The main finding 
of this study is that altruism does not operate at low but at middle income levels, 
although the coefficients on the recipient’s income are rather small. 
 
Gibson, Olivia and Rozelle (2006) test the mixed-motives framework of Cox, et al 
(2004) analyzing internal transfers in four developing countries (Indonesia, Vietnam, 
China and Papua New Guinea). Their results show very limited support for the main 
predictions of the mixed-motives model; a weak relationship between transfers and 
recipients’ income in only one of the four countries, Papua New Guinea. 
 
One of the main aims of this paper is to examine the extent to which the explicit 
incorporation of subjectively-assessed need in the specification of the threshold 
welfare level at which the donors’ dominant motive switches is amenable to empirical 
measurement and provides a more robust method for testing the mixed-motives 
model. Apart from Cox et al (2004) there have been very few empirical tests of the 
mixed motives model (see Kazianga, 2006; Gibson et al, 2006), and to our knowledge 
this is the first instance in which it tested specifically in relation to the remittance 
transfers of international migrants. 
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3. Introducing subjectively-assessed need into a mixed-motives model 
 
In estimating their model Cox et al (2004) had no basis for determining a priori the 
threshold level of income at which to set the knot-point of their spline function. 
Instead, they estimate the model using a non-linear least squares (NLLS) technique in 
which the threshold income level is treated as an unknown parameter. One limitation 
of this approach is the somewhat arbitrary basis on which the knot-point is 
determined, which is difficult to justify on theoretical grounds. In defence of this 
approach they argue that because the estimated threshold was very close to the official 
poverty line for the Philippines, it could be interpreted as a reasonable indicator of the 
households’ perceived’ threshold poverty line; that is, it represents an estimate of a 
subjectively-assessed ‘minimum consumption bundle’ (Cox et al: 2210). The case for 
a transfer derivatives model based on recipients’ subjectively-determined needs is 
appealing. However, rather than inferring a threshold from an econometrically-derived 
knot-point, the main objective of this study is to test an alternative method of deriving 
the threshold income level, in line with current economics literature on subjective 
welfare. We retain most of the ingredients and propositions of Cox et al (2004), but 
with one important difference; the use of a self-assessed measure of household 
welfare. This, we argue, has a number of advantages. First, it can be theoretically 
justified in relation to current literature on subjective welfare and relative deprivation. 
Second, it can be measured independently of the estimation of the model itself, using 
a suitably customized household survey questionnaire. Third, it allows for the 
possibility that the threshold level of “adequate” income can be set at a household-
specific level which can be expected to vary between households from different 
networks or reference groups, which is indeed the case of other privately-funded 
social protection mechanisms such as superannuation  (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 
2000). 
 
The notion that private transfers could be motivated by recipient households’ 
subjectively assessed needs, rather than by some externally-derived ‘objective’ 
poverty line, is not new to the income transfers literature. Indeed, in a much earlier 
and somewhat neglected paper, Kaufman and Lindauer (1986) posit and test 
empirically a model of private transfers in which they introduce the notion of a 
‘required’ income level that varies across households belonging to different reference 
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groups or ‘networks’. Each network has its own subjectively-determined required 
income level. In their single-motive model, unlike Cox et al (2004), once the recipient 
household’s threshold level of income is reached, income transfers to it will cease; i.e. 
at some subjectively-determined threshold level, determined by the tastes and means 
of the reference group or ‘network’ with which the household identifies.  
 
In support of a subjectively-determined threshold income level it has been argued that 
when individuals make judgments about their well-being, they compare their objective 
welfare level with a ‘subjective living norm’, which is strongly influenced by the 
average level of living enjoyed by their peers or reference group (Easterlin, 1995). 
The sociological and psychological literature on subjective welfare and relative 
deprivation posits that individuals compare themselves with ‘like’ individuals, so that 
when an individual’s level of living falls below that enjoyed by the reference group, 
feelings of poverty and deprivation are evoked (Runciman, 1966; Stewart, 2005; 
Townsend, 1979). Similarly, an important strand of the poverty literature argues that 
poverty is a relative concept requiring the use of relative poverty lines that take 
account of the types of diet, clothing and housing that are considered adequate to 
function in the society in which they live (Townsend, 1979; Sen, 1981; 1983; Ruggeri 
et al, 2003; Bourguinon and Fields, 1997; Atkinson, 1989). What a middle-income 
family, living in an urban center considers adequate to provide for their basic needs 
would most probably be higher than the official poverty line.  
 
Recent empirical studies have also shown that household welfare depends positively 
on one's own consumption but negatively on the average consumption level of the 
household’s reference group (Easterlin, 2001; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; 
Luttmer, 2005; Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008). In the mixed-motives model advanced 
here it is assumed similarly that the household compares its consumption level with a 
‘subjective living norm’, that is, with what it, in comparison with other households 
within the same reference group, considers adequate to get by. If, for each household, 
the subjectively-assessed needs and associated threshold income level are known, the 
main regressor in the model can be expressed as the difference between the 
household’s subjectively-assessed threshold and pre-transfer income level. From the 
donor’s point of view the recipient household’s utility is a function of a variable 
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(CGAPh) that measures the difference between the household’s actual consumption 
levels (Ch) and this ‘subjective living norm’ (Ah).  
 
The equivalent of this variable in income terms is the Subjective Income Gap (we use 
the acronym IGAPh), that is, the difference between household income from all 
sources (Yh), and what the donor considers to be the amount required for the provision 
of an adequate standard of living of the household (Imin). We introduce this revision to 
the mixed-motives model which we label the Subjective Income Gap variant. Our 
subjective measure of welfare also provides an obvious and explicit threshold income 
level for determining, in a mixed-motives model, the point at which the donor’s 
dominant motive switches from altruism to exchange. Below this threshold, altruistic 
concerns prevail because the donor regards the household’s resources to be inadequate 
to provide for the required standard of living. It is then reasonable to assume that 
transfers are aimed at increasing the household’s welfare.4 At pre-transfer income 
levels above the threshold the donor has no reason to be concerned about the recipient 
household’s level of welfare, which is deemed adequate, which allows the exchange 
motive to become dominant at the margin.5 
 
The basic elements of the donor’s maximization program in the model of Cox et al 
(2004) therefore remain unchanged. The only difference is that in this modified 
version the household’s pre-transfer consumption variable (Ch) is substituted by a new 
subjective welfare variable measuring the subjective needs gap (CGAPh). Equation (1) 
then needs to be re-written: 
  
 ( )[ ]SCGAPVSCUMax hd
ST
d ,,,
,
        (2) 
where,   
CGAPh = recipient household’s subjective consumption gap. 
 
Likewise, household income (Yh) is substituted by the subjective income gap variable 
(IGAPh). In effect, the predictions of the mixed motives model of Cox et al (2004) 
regarding the relationship between household welfare and transfers remain the same, 
                                                 
4 In the model of Cox et al (2004) that is indeed the reason why the recipient household’s participation 
constraint will be non-binding in the altruistically-driven donor’s program. 
5 Under exchange the recipient household’s participation constraint will be binding in the donor’s program. 
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but with household welfare now measured using the subjective income gap, rather 
than absolute income level. This also provides a theoretically justifiable knot-point for 
the spline function, where IGAPh is equal to zero. 
 
The objective of the empirical analysis to estimate a remittances model that on the one 
hand uses subjective income gap, rather than income, as the independent variable and 
on the other, takes into account the non-linear relationship between subjective income 
gap and remittances. The relationship between remittances and subjective income gap 
(IGAPh) is depicted in Figure 1. For the ‘subjective poor’ households, that is those 
with a negative income gap, remittances are hypothesized to be driven by altruism. 
However once the threshold K is reached, at subjective income gap equal to zero, 
remittances become exchange driven. As discussed by Cox et al (2004), not 
accounting for this non-linearity could lead to an underestimation of the 
responsiveness of transfers to recipient’s welfare, or worse, that the hypothesized 
relationship is found to be not statistically significant. 
 
 [insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Following this theoretical model, a spline rather than linear specification for the 
subjective income gap variable is used in formulating the remittances equation (2). 
The threshold at which migrants switch from altruism to exchange is identified at zero 
values of the subjective income gap variable. Formally, the objective is to estimate the 
following remittances equation: 
 
Rh = [ ] hhhhhhh udKKIGAPIGAPZX +−++++ *)(54321 βββββ     
(3)   
 
Where: 
 Rh = international remittances received by the household6  
Xh = Vector of household variables 
Zh = Vector of migrant variables 
IGAPh = Household subjective income gap = actual income less required income 
                                                 
6 As the survey did not collect data on the transfers of each individual migrant this study focuses on total 
remittances received by households from international migrants. 
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Kh = Knot-point = 0 
dKh = 1 if IGAPh >= Kh, 0 otherwise 
 
4. Survey data and descriptive statistics 
 
The survey 
We use data from a customized household survey designed and implemented by the 
authors on the main island of Fiji, Viti Levu, during the first half of 2005.7 Fiji is a 
relatively poor country with a virtually non-existent public welfare system and with 
households highly dependent on private transfer income, almost exclusively from 
international migrants. The survey instrument was structured around the household, 
which is taken as the basic unit of analysis8. In spite of socio-cultural institutions 
encouraging strong kinship and clan ties, the households are the basic social units with 
command over economic resources and responsibility for their members’ welfare. 
This view of the household as the basic unit of South Pacific society is also supported 
by the national statistical agencies, which use the household as the unit of analysis for 
the purpose of collecting data on assets ownership, farming and other economic 
activities (UNDP, 1997). The customized questionnaire adopted the local definition of 
household, that is, “those who cook and eat from the same pot”. Information about 
external income shocks suffered by the household in 2004 was also collected.  
 
Most surveys in the migration and remittances literature either assume that household 
members and relatives are equivalent concepts or leave the definition open to the 
interpretation of individual interviewers and respondents. As the main focus of the 
survey was on migrant households and the international transfers they receive, the 
questionnaire included numerous questions to assist respondents in identifying 
migrant household members and recalling the receipt of cash and in-kind transfers in 
all forms and sent via all channels, both formal and informal. To adhere to a consistent 
definition of the migration status of the household, the survey set clear parameters to 
define who the household migrant members were. For instance, using the adopted 
                                                 
7 For details of the design of the survey instrument, selection of enumeration areas, sampling and survey 
administration, see Appendix C in World Bank (2006). 
8 The migration literature has traditionally taken the household as the unit of analysis in migration and 
remittances research (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Stark, 1991; Massey, 1990; Stark and Bloom, 1985; 
Stark and Lucas, 1988). 
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definition of household, migrants by definition would not be counted as household 
members, as they do not cook and eat from the same pot. Two criteria were used to 
identify a migrant household member; (a) retrospective condition: the individual was 
a household member before migrating; or, (b) future condition: the migrant would 
cook and eat from the same pot as the household if she were to return to her home 
country in the near future. The questionnaire also contained some questions about 
individual migrants but these were of a more general nature since the pilot survey had 
found that respondents were most unlikely to possess detailed and accurate knowledge 
about international migrants.  
 
The sections on household income and transfers applied to the year 2004. The 
questions about international migrant transfers received were asked of all interviewed 
households, including those that reported not having a household member abroad, and 
covered all forms of transfers including cash, goods, payments for household 
members’ overseas travel and bills paid on behalf of the household. These transfers 
were treated as separate supplements to income from all other sources. 
 
The income section of the questionnaire included the ‘minimum income question’, 
which asked the respondent about the amount of cash income that “a household like 
yours’ would require just to get by”. In other words, this question asked the 
respondent what amount of income was required to provide for the basic needs of a 
household in her reference group and was included specifically to allow for the 
empirical estimation of a knot-point for the spline function in a mixed-motives model. 
This estimate of the minimum required income was then used to estimate the 
subjective income gap variable (IGAPh) as  previously discussed  
 
In this study we use two measures of IGAPh; a household-specific measure and a 
community-specific measure. For the first, we use each households’ stated ‘required 
income’ and declared income level to compute IGAPh, while for the second, we use 
the median of the stated ‘required income’ across the entire community of Viti Levu. 
Our assumption here is that if the networks and social groups on the island of Viti 
Levu are considered sufficiently diverse to have significantly different ‘subjective 
living norms’, the first measure might be considered more appropriate. If the 
community shares reasonably similar subjective living norms then it might make 
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better sense to use a common ‘required income’ level across the community.9  We test 
both of these in the econometric estimation of the model. 
 
The sample was made up of 418 households, with information collected for the 
household and for each individual within the household giving a total of 1,937 
individuals. Fiji comprises 322 islands, with approximately 110 of them inhabited. 
The main island of Viti-Levu has a population of approximately 600 thousand. The 
sample consisted of urban and rural enumeration areas, scattered across the island. 
They cover the capital city, Suva; the five major towns in both provinces (Nausori, 
Lautoka, Nadi, Ba and Sigatoka); nine villages and twelve settlements. 
 
Descriptive statistics and explanatory variables 
Table 1 shows the mean levels of transfers for households in the poorest 40%, the 
middle 40% and the richest 20%, categorized in accordance with the size of the 
subjective income gap variable (IGAPh), using the household-specific and community-
specific measures. As predicted by our modified version of the mixed-motives model, 
the poorest 40% of those classified using household-specific IGAPh reported average 
transfers per household more than double ($704) the level of those in the middle 40% 
group ($345)10. When comparing the transfers received by the middle and richest 
IGAPh groups, it can be seen that the latter were almost double the former11.  
 
 [insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In comparison, when households are classified using the community-specific IGAPh 
welfare measure, the poorest 40% reported mean transfers slightly higher than those in 
the middle income category, but the difference is not statistically significant.12 
Transfers to the richest 20% were about 20% higher than those observed for 
households in the middle income category, but again this difference was not 
                                                 
9 Using a community-specific measure with the knot-point set at the median of the required income across 
the community is equivalent to using a fixed absolute measure of household income as in Cox et al (2004). 
The main difference is that in our case this is derived from the survey data rather than the estimation 
process. 
10 Difference significant at the 1% level: t-statistic =1.81, degrees of freedom = 332, p-value 0.04. 
11 Difference significant at the 1% level: t-statistic =-1.80 degrees of freedom = 248, p-value 0.04. 
12 Difference not statistically significant at conventional levels: t-statistic =0.85, degrees of freedom = 337, 
p-value 0.20. 
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statistically significant.13 These differences suggest that the household-specific 
subjective income gap version of the mixed motives model might better uncover the 
donors’ motives than when a common, community-level measure is used. We test and 
compare the two models econometrically in the next section.  
 
A description of the variables used in the empirical estimation is provided in Table 2. 
The means and standard deviations of these variables are reported in Table 3, which 
also shows separate values for the sub-samples of transfer-receiving and non-receiving 
households.  
 
 [insert Tables 2 & 3 about here] 
 
Four alternative econometric models were estimated, the results of which are reported 
in section 5.  In the first two models the main regressor is the household-specific 
IGAPh variable. In the second set of models the principal regressor is the community-
specific IGAPh variable. Within each of these models we estimate two specifications; 
a linear and a non-linear, spline model. We estimate the alternative regressions for 
comparative purposes and to test the robustness of the results for our IGAP model, 
specifically, in relation to: (i) a non-linear spline specification following Cox et al 
(2004) compared with the more conventional linear specification; and, (ii) the use of a 
household-specific measure of the subjective income gap as opposed to one which 
assumes a common level of subjectively-assessed welfare across all households in the 
community. The method used by Cox et al is, in effect, equivalent to what we label a 
community-specific measure. Although they do not derive their knot-point in the same 
way as we do, using a customized survey question, they suggest that their 
econometrically-derived knot-point, which is set a common income level across all 
households in their simple from the Philippines, can be interpreted as a reasonable 
indicator of the households’ perceived’ threshold poverty line; that is, as some form of 
subjectively-assessed ‘minimum consumption bundle’ a poverty line ‘perceived by 
households’ (p.2210). 
 
                                                 
13 Difference not statistically significant at convencional levels: t-statistic =-0.52, degrees of freedom = 248, 
p-value 0.30. 
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Although in both cases the knot-point is set where the variable IGAPh is equal to zero, 
the procedure for setting the knot-point of the spline differs between the two 
approaches. For the household-specific measure the knot-point is set for each 
household where actual, pre-transfer income is equal to the particular household’s 
subjective ‘required income’. For the community-specific measure the knot-point is 
set for each household where actual pre-transfer income is equal to a common 
threshold income level equal to the median value of the community’s ‘required 
income’. In the case of Viti Levu this is equal to US$3,000 per household per annum, 
and could be interpreted as a poverty line based on a subjective assessment of need. 
 
An explanation for the choice of control variables is in order. The model also controls 
for household size, as it is expected that the larger the household, the more requests 
for transfers the migrants will receive.14 A dummy variable identifying those 
households that had at least one of their members living abroad was also included. 
Although a high proportion of households without migrants also received transfers, 
preliminary descriptive analysis showed that the level of transfers received by 
households with international migrants is substantially higher (World Bank, 2006).  
 
To control for the income level of the donor, as we did not have data on the individual 
migrants’ income,15 we used the presence of migrants in the Gulf states or Canada as a 
proxy. The model also controls for migrants’ length of stay abroad, as there is a 
general concern in the migration literature over so-called ‘remittance’ decay’ as the 
migrants’ length of absence from the home community increases. 
   
5.  Econometric estimation 
 
Due to transfers being a censored variable, Tobit, rather than OLS models are 
commonly estimated. However, we use instrumental variable techniques to test for 
possible endogeneity of the subjective income gap variables in the linear 
specifications. The excluded instrument is a variable measuring the number of 
                                                 
14 Due to potential endogeneity concerns, this variable was excluded in alternative specifications and 
reassuringly the results did not change. Results available from the authors on request.  
15 As discussed in Kazianga (2006), if the incomes of donors and recipients are correlated, failing to control 
for the donor’s income could lead to omitted variable bias. See also Altonji et al (1997) where altruism is 
modelled and tested in relation to simultaneous changes in income of both  donor and recipient. 
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negative income shocks the household suffered during the year.16 We expect this 
variable to be correlated to the subjective income gap, implying that households 
suffering a negative income shock in 2004 would be more likely to have lower levels 
of relative welfare as measured by their subjective income gap (IGAPh). On the other 
hand, since we are controlling for the presence of overseas migrants in the household, 
we do not expect this instrument to be correlated with remittances due to unobserved 
characteristics of the household, such as entrepreneurial capacities and risk aversion. 
Statistical tests found that the instrument was strong in both models, with a first-stage 
F-statistic17 of 18.2 for the household-specific variant of the model and 14.1 for the 
community-specific variant. Therefore we proceeded to test the null hypothesis that 
the main variables of interest were exogenous in the respective remittances equation. 
In both cases the Wald test of exogeneity could not reject the null hypothesis, with a 
robust Chi-Square statistic of 0.71 (p-value = 0.40) for the household-specific variant 
of the model and a robust Chi-Square statistic of 0.60 (p-value = 0.44) for the 
community-specific variant of the model.18  
 
The results of the four Tobit19 models are reported in Table 4. In all cases the 
equations were estimated using standard Tobit regression analysis as discussed 
previously, and where the standard errors were calculated taking into account a 
possible correlation of errors across households from the same community. 
  
[insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 
Turning first to the results of the two spline models, we expect the coefficient on the 
variable for income below the threshold to be negative, since altruism is the dominant 
motive for these households. Conversely, for income above the threshold we expect a 
positive relationship, as the exchange motive is hypothesized to dominate. These 
predictions are confirmed by the results which show, in both specifications, that the 
                                                 
16 This variable is based on a question in the survey in which the respondents were required to indicate 
whether they had suffered an unexpected drop in one or more components of household income in the 
preceding year. 
17 Statistic robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering. 
18 Furthermore, similar results for the endogeneity tests were obtained when the censoring of the dependent 
variable was  ignored. Results available from the authors on request.  
19 To test the sensitivity of the results to this functional form OLS models were also estimated. The results 
were very similar. See Appendix Table A.1.  
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coefficients on income levels below the threshold level (IGAPh) are negative and 
statistically significant, and above the threshold (Positive IGAPh) they are positive and 
significant. Conversely, in the linear models, the coefficients are very much smaller, 
and are not statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance for the main 
variables of interest in both linear models indicate that failing to allow for non-
linearity in the relationship between household welfare and transfers could lead to the 
misleading conclusion that there is not a strong relationship between remittances and 
the recipient household’s level of pre-transfer welfare. 
 
On the other hand, the results also indicate that setting the knot-point using a 
theoretically justifiable and empirically estimated subjective threshold income level 
produces results that are more consistent with the predictions of the mixed-motives 
model than in the other empirical studies reported earlier in this paper. To examine the 
strength of the estimated relationships from the Tobit regression results we use the 
respective marginal effects shown in Table 5. 
 
 [insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The marginal effects for the linear specifications of the Tobit models are not 
statistically significant in either case, and are also considerably smaller in comparison 
with the marginal effects for the spline specifications. Comparing the two variants of 
the spline model, we observe, first, that altruistically-motivated transfers appear to be 
more responsive to household need when the household-specific measure of 
subjective welfare measure is used. Remittances increase (decrease) by $84 for every 
$1,000 drop (rise) in recipient household income as opposed to $64 when a 
community-specific measure is used. Second, bearing in mind that the responsiveness 
of transfers to recipient income changes for households above the threshold is given 
by the sum of the two coefficients 54 ββ +  in equation (3), both variants of the 
subjective income model indicate a positive, albeit a much weaker, relationship in 
comparison with the negative relationship for households below the threshold. In 
other words, altruistically-motivated remittances are considerably more responsive 
than exchange-motivated remittances to recipient income changes. Remittances 
increase (decrease) by relatively more when the household-specific measure of the 
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subjective income gap model is used; $2.6 for every $1,000 increase (decrease) in 
recipient household income, as opposed to $1.5 when the community-specific 
measure is used. 
 
These results indicate that crowding-out effects of welfare gains among lower income 
groups are much stronger than those estimated by other studies using empirically-
based objective measures of household need (Cox et al, 2004; Kazianga, 2006; 
Gibson et al 2006). To some extent these effects will be offset by crowding-in of 
exchange-motivated remittances among the wealthier households, but in this instance 
the effects are rather weak, suggesting that welfare improvements among lower-
income households are likely to reduce the net inflow of remittances ceteris paribus. 
 
The control variables all have the expected signs. In all four models the variables 
capturing households living in the capital city (Capital City), and those with at least 
one migrant (Migration Status), are positive and significant at the 1% level. 
Households with a migrant member not in Australia or New Zealand (Non-
Australasian Migrant) is positive and significant at the 5% or 10% level. The variable 
capturing migrants’ length of stay abroad (Migrant Length of Stay) is negative in all 
models, but statistically significant in only one instance (at the 10% level), the spline 
model with the community-specific measure of household need, indicating possible 
presence of remittance decay over time. 
     
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The mixed-motives model uncovers a much stronger and statistically significant 
relationship between transfers and recipient household welfare than a single-motive 
(linear) model for altruistically-motivated transfers tested using the same sample. This 
implies that remittances provide a form of family-based, social protection coverage to 
households below the required income threshold. It also follows that the crowding-out 
effect on remittances of improved welfare levels among the poorer households might 
be stronger than previously estimated when using a linear, single-objective model to 
estimate migrants’ motives to remit. 
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We also find that using a theoretically justified subjective measure of recipient 
household welfare  provides stronger support for the presence of motive-switching 
(i.e. to the exchange motive), for households above the threshold welfare level, when 
we compare these with estimates from other studies of mixed-motives using objective 
measures of welfare, such as poverty lines. This suggests importantly that a degree of 
crowding-in of private transfers, driven by the hypothesized exchange motive, applies 
to households above the threshold. However, in this study, the crowding-in effect is 
considerably weaker than the crowding-out effect making it highly unlikely that the 
former could offset the latter. Effective policy alleviation interventions could also 
have the unexpected effect of reducing a country’s foreign exchange earnings.  
 
It also appears that whether a household-specific or a community-specific measure of 
subjectively-assessed welfare is used does not affect the main conclusions. In this case 
the two measures of subjectively-assessed welfare were based on survey data from 
households on one island in the South Pacific, Viti Levu, with a total population of 
only 600 thousand. If the reference norms for this population in relation to subjective 
welfare comparisons are fairly standard across the different networks and social 
groups it is perhaps to be expected that the household-specific and community-
specific measures yield quite similar results. However, in larger and more diverse 
societies this is less likely to be the case. 
 
Where mixed motives with opposite effects on remittances apply, the net effect of pre-
transfer welfare improvements on remittance flows will depend partly on the relative 
magnitude of such welfare gains between those above and below the threshold, and on 
how the migrant households are distributed between those below and above the 
threshold welfare level. This raises the further possibility that effective poverty-
alleviation policy interventions that reduce the proportion of households below the 
threshold, could be accompanied by a shift in the distribution of remittances in favor 
of those above the threshold. The net effects of recipients’ welfare improvements on 
remittances, and the effects of remittances on poverty alleviation and income 
distribution are consequently more complex and ambiguous than previous studies 
suggest. 
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Figure 1 Relationship between Remittances and the Subjective Income Gap 
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Table 1 Remittances Received by Income Category  
(US$, 2004) 
 
Household 
Category 
Mean Household Remittances Received* 
Household-Specific 
IGAP 
Community-Specific 
IGAP 
 
Poorest 40% 703.8 
(2,342.4) 
 
644.5 
(2,350.1) 
 
Middle 40% 
 
345.0 
(1,020.8) 
463.7 
(1,483.6) 
 
Richest 20% 
 
673.5 
(1,862.0) 
559.8 
(1,046.2) 
*Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Table 2 Variable Definitions 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 Sample (n = 417) Recipients ( n= 174 Non-Recipients (n = 243) 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Remittances 554.07 1,821.59 1,327.86 2,635.35 0.00 0.00 
Household income 6,219.07 8,647.09 6,997.37 7,838.44 5,661.77 9,157.72 
Subjective Income Gap (IGAPh) 2,530.59 7,771.02 2,706.05 6,760.01 1,602.01 8,432.24 
Capital City 0.21 ---- 0.28 ---- 0.16 ---- 
Indo-Fijian 0.47 ---- 0.57 ---- 0.40 ---- 
Household Size 4.70 2.29 4.63 2.48 4.76 2.15 
Migration Status 0.35 ---- 0.70 ---- 0.09 ---- 
Migrant Length of Stay 3.08 6.07 6.45 7.61 0.68 2.80 
Non-Australasian Migrant 0.08 ---- 0.18 ---- 0.01 ---- 
---- not applicable 
Variable Variable description 
Remittances International transfers received by household in all forms, cash and in-
kind ( US$) 
Household income Total household income from all sources  excluding migrant transfers 
(US$) 
Subjective Income Gap (IGAPh) Required income minus household income excluding migrant transfers 
(US$) 
Capital City Dummy for household in capital city (=1 if yes, otherwise 0) 
Indo-Fijian Dummy for household of Indo-Fijian ethnicity (=1 if yes, otherwise 0) 
Household Size 
 
Number of household members, excluding migrants (No.) 
Migration Status Dummy for household with migrant overseas (=1 if yes, otherwise 0) 
Migrant Length of Stay   
 
Average length of stay of overseas migrants for the household (yrs) 
Non-Australasian Migrant Dummy for migrant in country other than Australia or New Zealand (=1 
if yes, otherwise 0) 
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Table 4 Tobit Regression Results: Subjective Income Gap Models 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the community (PSU) level.  
*** significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
---- not applicable  
 
 
 
Table 5 Tobit Regression Marginal Effects on Remittances 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the community (PSU) level. 
*** significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
---- not applicable;  
+ in spline model this coefficient is for 4β in equation (3), showing the relationship for households 
below the threshold level 
++ the relationship for households above the threshold level is given by the sum of coefficients on 
IGAP and Positive IGAPh or, 54 ββ +  in equation (3). 
Dependent Variable 
(=  Remittances) 
Household Specific Need 
 
Community Specific Need 
 
 Linear Spline Linear Spline 
Subjective Income Gap (IGAPh) -0.032 
(0.026) 
-0.318**
(0.159) 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
-0.244*** 
(0.095) 
Positive IGAPh ---- 0.328
**
(0.163) 
---- 0.250*** 
(0.091)  
Capital City 1443.046*** 
(454.120) 
1111.923***
(426.117) 
1453.981***
(477.334) 
1334.846*** 
(412.257) 
Indo-Fijian 
 
-218.042 
(420.184) 
-270.319 
(399.829) 
-228.583 
(413.596) 
-179.216 
(428.635) 
Household Size 91.510 
(65.809) 
65.880 
(63.000) 
89.001 
(67.313) 
97.881 
(70.327) 
Migration Status 3846.987*** 
(949.647) 
3777.161***
(882.815) 
3847.96***
(965.675) 
3947.046*** 
(979.724) 
Migrant Length of Stay -48.776 
(30.471) 
-42.444
(27.546) 
-48.288
(31.585) 
-53.109* 
(49.431) 
Non-Australasian Migrant 1454.275** 
(737.947) 
1267.361*
(714.788) 
1487.012**
(743.507) 
1395.681** 
(721.739) 
Constant -3225.435*** 
(771.545) 
-3206.029*** 
(761.715) 
-3260.397***
(801.984) 
-3527.608*** 
(869.914) 
No. Observations 417 417 417 417 
F-stat 7.670 6.100 9.260 7.799 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dependent Variable 
(=$ remittances per $1000 income) 
Household Specific Need 
 
Community Specific Need 
 
 Linear Spline Linear Spline 
Subjective Income Gap (IGAPh)+ -0.852 
(0.645) 
-84.105**
(41.160) 
-3.326 
(5.150) 
-64.536** 
(23.720) 
Positive IGAPh++ ---- 86.753
**
(42.480) 
---- 66.030 
(22.980) *** 
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Appendix Table 1 OLS Regression Results for Subjective Income Gap Model 
 
  
 
Dependent Variable 
(=  Remittances) 
Household Specific Need 
 
Community Specific Need 
 
 Linear Spline Linear Spline 
Subjective Income Gap (IGAPh)+ 
(per $1000) 
-16.043 
(11.191) 
-206.169
(132.065) 
-9.660 
(8.411) 
-120.027** 
(55.529) 
Positive IGAPh (per $1000) ---- 205.226
(132.392) 
---- 116.501*** 
(52.752) 
Capital City  621.111*** 
(218.990) 
468.731***
(169.104) 
637.442***
(224.823) 
606.029*** 
(206.477) 
Indo-Fijian 
 
-445.371* 
(420.184) 
-463.377* 
(239.853) 
-443.409* 
(239.002) 
-408.986* 
(244.405) 
Household Size 42.416 
(38.126) 
29.820 
(36.891) 
43.897 
(38.515) 
47.366 
(40.316) 
Migration Status 1599.673*** 
(504.105) 
1579.574***
(474.528) 
1606.219***
(510.538) 
1650.237*** 
(516.098) 
Migrant Length of Stay -65.747* 
(33.491) 
-61.758*
(31.078) 
-65.903*
(33.943) 
-68.086* 
(34.412) 
Non-Australasian Migrant 1171.065* 
(663.528)* 
1037.865
(652.843) 
1176.329*
(663.070) 
1133.256* 
(655.481) 
Constant 32.441 
(218.950) 
13.828 
(239.545) 
9.469
(221.660) 
-114.261 
(253.511) 
No. Observations 417 417 417 417 
R2 0.204 0.237 0.201 0.207 
